



**AUTO**  
*affection*

unconscious thought in the age of teletechnology

Patricia Ticeketa Slough

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# Autoaffection

Unconscious Thought  
in the Age of Teletechnology

Patricia Ticineto Clough



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Minneapolis  
London

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For my parents,  
Felix Ticineto and Josephine Ticineto

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This book was written when much was changing in and outside the academy (even the meaning of *inside* and *outside* changed once again). Writing became rewriting in the strong sense of the term. A book first planned to be a summary review of poststructuralist thought became instead a search for the future of thought beyond poststructuralism and its cultural criticisms influenced by poststructuralism. What started as a relatively easy project became a seriously challenging one. Through it all, there were those who were an inspiration and a support, friends and colleagues as well as thinkers whose imagination and intellectual daring matter so much to me and have shaped much of what follows. I want especially to thank Stanley Aronowitz, Barbara Bowen, Judith Butler, Lynn Chancer, Adele Clarke, Jonathan Culler, Norman K. Denzin, Richard Dienst, Hester Eisenstein, Nicole Ferron, Ana Galagari, Martha Gevers, Barry Glassner, Liz Gross, Zali Larevitch, Donna Haraway, Elizabeth Harris, Barbara Heyl, Amy Hoffman, Anahid Kassabian, David Kazanjian, Steven Kruger, Charles Letter, Kathy Lord, Randy Martin, Humberto Maturana, Michal McCall, Chet Meeks, Nancy K. Miller, Mary Jo Neitz, Linda Nicholson, Tony O'Brien, Virginia Olesen, Jackie Orr, Paul Pungaro, Stephen Pfohl, Francesca Poletta, Anil Rai, Joseph Schneider, Steven Seidman, Catherine Silver, Charlie Smith, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Ipsana Uppal, Heinz von Foerster, and Judith Wittner. And a most special thanks to Margaret Cerullo and Ron Lembo for the sheer pleasure of our times together, which made writing this book possible at all.

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# INTRODUCTION

## Thought's Reach to the Future

In an interview published nearly two decades ago, Michel Foucault announced that much of what he had written — what was part of a body of criticism already known as poststructuralism — would best be understood as putting an end to a certain tradition of thought rather than providing a way for thought to begin anew. It was an arresting comment. True, Foucault had treated an established tradition of thought, what he referred to as the modern western discourse of Man. But his writings, as well as those of the other so-called poststructuralists, had opened to consideration a number of assumptions that up to then had gone without question. In doing so, the poststructuralists had forced invention. Surely a certain intellectual stamina would be required just to remain open to the various cultural criticisms, which, over the last three decades of the twentieth century, became engaged with poststructuralism and invited scholars into disciplines other than their own, even inviting them to explore the policed spaces of silence in and in between the disciplines.

But the excited and exciting debates that poststructuralism provoked, and which for some time have characterized academic and intellectual discourses, seem finally to have calmed. If cultural criticism has been drawn back from invention, Foucault's comment still haunts, insistently raising the question: have the various cultural criticisms elaborated over the last three decades of the twentieth century made way for thought to begin anew; have they given thought a future? Propelled by this question, the chapters that follow look back over the past three decades in order to trace the future of thought, which, I want to argue, has drawn

poststructuralism to it from the start and which has been further elaborated in the cultural criticisms engaged with poststructuralism, such as feminist theory, postcolonial theory, queer theory, critical race theory, Marxist cultural studies, cultural studies of science, and the criticism of ethnographic writing. It is this future that I am calling the age of teletechnology.

Although the cultural criticisms engaged with poststructuralism usually have been treated as elaborations of the linguistic turn, focusing on the literary or the literarization of philosophical thought, I want to treat them in relationship to the becoming of the teletechnological. I want to propose that the development of teletechnology in the late twentieth century not only has drawn cultural criticism to the reconfiguration of the social, the political, and the economic conditions of human agency. The development of teletechnology also has drawn cultural criticism to the deconstruction of the opposition of nature and technology, the human and the machine, the virtual and the real, the living and the inert, thereby giving thought over to the nonologization of agencies other than human agency. The chapters that follow, therefore, are less about the influence of teletechnology on societies of the late twentieth century than they are about the cultural criticisms of the late twentieth century and the way their engagement with poststructuralism has drawn them to teletechnology and the future of thought, albeit often without full awareness of it.

But to suggest, as I am, that cultural critics have been drawn by teletechnology to give thought over to a future that they themselves have not always fully grasped is to propose that thought is not given by individual thinkers so much as it is given to them as they are drawn to the future by it. One thinks of "thought" in this way, as Jacques Derrida once put it, when "one cannot say philosophy, theory, logic, structure, scene or anything else; when one can no longer use any word of this sort. . . ." It is in this sense that thought is unconscious and not simply a rational process. It was, of course, against the normative idealization of thought as rational that poststructuralism aimed its critique. The noncoincidence of the subject with consciousness, realized with the deconstruction of the subject, not only gives thought over to an individual's unconscious, the mark in the individual of the noncoincidence of its subjectivity with a conscious self; it also puts thought outside subjectivity, even outside human intersubjectivity, giving thought over to

its own movement, intensities, and affects. A more general unconscious than that of the subject or of intersubjectivity is implied; it is the unconscious of thought. But this way of thinking about thought, what Rosi Brandom characterizes as "postpersonal" in her treatment of Gilles Deleuze's philosophical efforts to think of thought as unconscious or as a desiring machine, is a way of thinking that is itself already drawn to the future, to the age of teletechnology.

By teletechnology I mean to refer to the realization of technoscience, technoculture, and technonature—that is, to the full interface of computer technology and television, promising globalized networks of information and communication whereby layers of electronic images, texts, and sounds flow in real time, so that the speeds of the territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization of social spaces, as well as the adjustment to the vulnerabilities of exposure to media event-ness, are beyond any user's mere decision to turn "it" on or off. Teletechnology, therefore, refers to all matter of "knowledge objects,"—technoscientific productions, from computer devices to intelligent machines to genomes—such that teletechnology is both a register and an actualization of postpersonal thought.

In this sense teletechnology refers not only to an environment or a set of objects, but also to agencies other than human agency, so that the teletechnological joins, if not displaces, what sociologists of western modernity have referred to as the social structural. This displacement demands a rethinking of the determination of human agency that the idea of social structure has implied—that is, the derivation of human agency out of that certain structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and civil society, and the public and private spheres presumed in subject-centered, nation-centric discourses, such as the modern western discourse of Man.

In the age of teletechnology this configuration of social spaces is being "smoothed out" or "ungrounded," to use Gilles Deleuze's terms, or "unhuddled," to use Saskia Sassen's term.<sup>1</sup> Even as the transnational or the global become visible, proposing themselves as far-flung extensions of social structure, they are ungrounded by that upon which they depend: the speed of the exchange of information, capital, bodies, and abstract knowledge and the vulnerability of exposure to media event-ness.<sup>2</sup> This transformation not only involves postmodern western or northern societies, where the arrangement of social spaces presumed in subject-

centered, nation-centric, discourses has been characteristic, at least until recently challenged by the teletechnological. It also involves societies in neocolonialism, where this arrangement of social spaces is not necessarily presumed, and, if imposed, not necessarily accepted, but where, nonetheless, the teletechnological speeds of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization, as well as the vulnerabilities of exposure to media event-ness, are having their effect in the "glocalization" of cultures and the production of technoculture and technonature.

But I do not mean to suggest that the teletechnological refers simply to the denationalization of the state or to the disappearance of any distinction between the public and private spheres, the family and the nation, and surely not to the deterritorialization of all social spaces, because what is to be expected instead is various reterritorializations in the reconfiguration of social spaces brought along with the transnationalization of capital and the globalization of teletechnology, such that the transnational and the global become nodes in various networks, alongside the local, the singular, the immanent. I do mean to suggest, however, that no matter how social spaces are being reconfigured in the age of teletechnology, there is an increased possibility of the release of the subject's agency from nonreflexive relationships to tradition, community, and large social structures. There is an increased probability of the reconfiguration of the modern "sociological imagination," which has been thought to link the individual subject to a national collectivity through the translation of "personal troubles" into "social problems," as C. Wright Mills famously put it.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, the agency of the subject is not to be rethought only in terms of the possibility of an increased reflexivity or complexity in relationship to tradition, community, and social structure. It is to be rethought also in terms of an increased reflexivity and complexity in relationship to the social situation of knowledge objects. But here agency refers not only to the subject, but to an interobjectivity, the limits of which reach to the widening recognition of the agencies immanent to matter, what Feng Cheah has referred to as "the dynamism of matter" or "mattering."<sup>6</sup> Here "matter-energy flows," as Manuel DeLanda argues, displace the "structural" as the ungrounding ground of agency.<sup>7</sup> Agencies rather inhere in the singular, subindividual, finite forces of mattering.

In referring to the agencies immanent to matter, as I will be doing, I do not mean to suggest a mere return of thought to the forces of nature as opposed to the conditions of culture. Although nature is not to be conceived merely as a cultural construction, nature also is not separable from culture or technology. That is to say, the agencies of the singular, subindividual, finite forces of mattering refer to an interpenetration of nature and technoculture all the way down; after all, the forces of mattering are realized as agencies through a technoscientific production. As DeLanda argues, what "has allowed us to 'see' matter as self-organizing is the advance in technology that materially supports the (non-linear) mathematics, and with it mathematical technology."<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Donna Haraway proposes that agencies such as those belonging to the fetus, the chip, the genome, or the database are realizable only as and through "material-semiotic objects"; that is, they are "forged by heterogeneous practices . . . of technoscience."<sup>2</sup> Although insisting on the political, economic, psychic, and cultural complexity of these practices, Haraway argues that material-semiotic objects in no meaningful way can be simply or only referred to human agency.

I want to suggest that it is the realization of the interpenetration of nature and technoculture, as well as the teletechnological transformation of the social spaces in terms of which human agency has been conceived in modern western discourse, that poststructuralism has both registered and referred to the domain of ontology. That is to say against the usual treatment of poststructuralism as involving an epistemological shift, I want to suggest that poststructuralism's reach to the future of thought is in its ontological implications. Derrida's treatment of *différance*, Foucault's treatment of the force relations of power, and Deleuze and Félix Guattari's treatment of machinic assemblages are, to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's phrasing, "thought . . . trying to touch the ontic."<sup>3</sup>

If, however, poststructuralism has ontological implications, it is not itself an ontology of presence. It rather problematizes an ontology of presence. It offers an ontological perspective, such that ontology is always haunted by what Derrida refers to as the "given": "This extremely difficult perhaps impossible idea," as Derrida describes "the gift," forces ontology to "break off . . . with all originary authenticity."<sup>4</sup> To be a pure gift, neither obligation nor debt can be induced; the gift cannot be returned or produce exchange. This impossible idea of the gift, of the



given, therefore, ruins any presumption of origin or authenticity in Being, it is preontological, or what Derrida refers to as "hauntological."<sup>14</sup> It is in this sense that I want to suggest that the ontological implications of poststructuralism cross through the ontology of presence, put origins and authenticity under erasure, making ontology impossible or only impossibly so. The shift in ontological perspective that poststructuralism implies makes ontologizing impossible but imperative, necessary for thinking Being anew, that is, for bringing Being back to the opening of ontology, to the preontological, and thereby inviting a rethinking of technicity as well. Poststructuralism, I want to suggest, offers an ontological perspective in which nature and technology, the body and the machine, the real and the virtual, the living and the inert are given in *differential* relationships, each inextinguishable from the other.

#### Mapping Unconscious Thought in the Age of Teletechnology

Of course, connections have already been drawn between the teletechnological and poststructuralism. The focus on writing and textuality produced in the deconstruction of the western modern discourse of *Man* has been recognized as an elaboration of a teletechnological aesthetic. The works of Derrida and Foucault, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, already have been treated in such terms.<sup>15</sup> But the scholars I want to consider are the cultural critics who have been engaged with poststructuralism, such as Fredric Jameson, Stuart Hall, Stanley Aronowitz, Richard Dyer, Michael Hardt, Paul Virilio, Kaja Silverman, Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, James Clifford, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Pheng Cheah, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Donna Haraway, Dorothy Smith, and Bruno Latour. I want to take up their works, tracing their engagement with poststructuralism, and thereby explore the reach of cultural criticism in the late twentieth century to the teletechnological. I want to make more explicit the ontological perspective to which teletechnology has drawn cultural criticism. The chapters that follow, then, represent a process of pursuing the unconscious thought of teletechnology in the cultural criticisms of the past three decades of the twentieth century.

A certain way of reading and writing is required, something like what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as rhizomatic reading and writing, which brings conceptualizations from various writings together, assembling them on the same plane so that these concepts can be made to provoke a problematization. In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari argue

that a concept is better understood as the construction of a question that urges one to adopt a new perspective. The concept in this sense has a "becoming" that refers to its relationship with other concepts on the same plane: "Here concepts link up with each other, support one another, coordinate their contours, articulate their respective problems."<sup>12</sup>

A concept is not connected to a problem in order to reformulate earlier concepts. Instead there is an assembling of concepts from across various problematizing series so that they can interfere with each other: as Deleuze and Guattari put it: "Each concept will branch off toward concepts that are differently composed but that constitute other regions of the same plane, answer to problems that can be connected to each other, and participate in a co-creation [of new thought]."<sup>13</sup> Concepts, therefore, are not referential; they do not explain by way of propositions. Being neither particularizations nor generalizations, concepts, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, are instead made of singularities. Concepts are to be treated in terms of "coincidence, condensation, or accumulation" of singularities as well as a shedding of singularities onto a "plane of consistency."<sup>14</sup> On such a plane concepts resonate with each other rather than cohere or correspond. They "vibrate" and give a new sense to thought.

It cannot go without saying, therefore, that a plane of consistency makes no reference to a unifying transcendental principle. The plane of consistency is a nontranscendental plane. It is a "machinic assemblage" — neither organism nor mechanistic. It is a composing apparatus, a composition of desire. The machinic assemblage is an unconscious surface upon which singularities move by desire that is neither individual nor personal, although a subject's desire can itself be part of a machinic assemblage. Whether it is really possible to conceptualize without presuming unities remains a question; nonetheless, the effort to do so, to do away with a pre-given transcendental principle of unity, is for Deleuze and Guattari, as well as for me, an effort to shift concepts from the regime of truth to that of desiring so that "categories like interesting, remarkable, or important . . . determine success or failure."<sup>15</sup>

All of this, however, already resonates with teletechnology and is to be more closely explored in the chapters that follow, where I want to set off vibrations between the teletechnological and various cultural criticisms engaged with poststructuralism; that is, I do not want to argue that teletechnology is the condition of possibility of these cultural criti-

isms in that they are historical symptoms of technological changes. It is not possible to make these claims, because it is not possible to say exactly what teletechnology will become or what its conceptualizations can still make happen. Furthermore, it is not possible to say much or as much as I have already said about the teletechnological without the cultural criticisms I consider in this book. My point is that these cultural criticisms are following thought in the teletechnological; they are giving cultural criticism the presumption of the teletechnological. They are giving us the unconscious thought of the age of teletechnology.

Many of the scholars whose writings I treat in this book already have had considerable attention, especially in the United States academy, but not only there. Many of these scholars have international star status, a teletechnological effect itself. Although this has meant that their writings have received as much dismissing commentary as careful criticism, the chapters that follow are not aimed at engaging the reception of various scholars. Still, in treating their writings again I do mean to suggest why they are interesting, remarkable, and important in ways, it seems to me, that even their authors do not or do not always realize. That is, putting various cultural criticisms on the same plane along with teletechnology allows me to draw out concepts with which to follow unconscious thought to a new ontological perspective.

The following chapters are especially focused on Marxist treatments of capitalism and psychoanalytic treatments of the unconscious, which, after all, poststructuralism meant to make problematic and which also have been central to the cultural criticisms that have engaged poststructuralism. These chapters, therefore, are still arguing against the traditions that inform Marxism and psychoanalysis; they drain the condensations around Marxism and psychoanalysis in order to follow unconscious thought beyond them. In what follows, then, I try to evoke the unconscious thought of teletechnology and follow its reach to the antic by drawing a map through cultural criticisms that engaged Marxism and psychoanalysis just as poststructuralism was deconstructing the authority of both by opening wide a disjuncture between the individual subject and nation-centric collectivities.

To give a first mapping, the chapters that follow take up early feminist film criticism, that of the 1970s and early 1980s, which elaborated Lacanian psychoanalysis not merely as a way to “read” film texts, but more as a way to flesh out the phallogocentric logic of unconscious desire

deployed in the dominant oedipal narrative organizing the western modern discourse of Man. Meant to give a feminist turn to Marxist cultural studies that also had taken a cue from Louis Althusser's treatment of the subject's unconscious formation in ideological textual forms of mediated cultures, feminist film theorists offered a discourse on the interpenetration of technology and the unconscious, pointing to what I refer to, following Derrida, as "the technical substrates of unconscious memory."<sup>10</sup> The discourse of feminist film theory gestured toward the relationship of technology to the psyche, space and time, Being and technicity, which was, however, never fully elaborated and never to fit comfortably in the then-burgeoning field of Marxist cultural studies of television.

An issue was the difficulty of treating television with the narrative approach of feminist film theory, not to mention the limitation of early feminist film theory in focusing on sexual difference to the exclusion of differences of race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and nation, or in focusing on film texts to the exclusion of institutional analysis of industries and audiences. The drift of Marxist cultural studies from Althusser to Antonio Gramsci and Ernesto Laclau under the influence of Stuart Hall also allowed a shift of emphasis from text to audience and the multiple and locally situated audience responses to television viewing. Justifying this shift, however, had the effect of narrowing the meaning of text. Certainly Derrida's treatment of textuality became widely misrepresented in this process.

In this context the complexity that Fredric Jameson found in rereading the generic form of the novel from romanticism to realism to the cinematics of Joseph Conrad's high modernism no longer seemed compelling; instead he and other Marxist critics moved from a treatment of the literary evidence of a political unconscious into a protracted debate over "postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism," in Jameson's influential phrasing. No matter what was argued in this debate, culture seemed to flatten out into a barrage of meaningless texts. Jameson, along with other Marxist cultural critics, all but sealed the fate of the concept of textuality. They both linked textuality to the superficial and connected it to the development of technology, which, however, was reduced to the capitalist organization of production. Although suffocated under a barrage of meaningless texts, History was thereby given one last chance — to overcome postmodernity through the dialectic

logic of capital. But what now seems more important about the debate over postmodernism and textuality is that Marxist studies of television were once again revised, turned away from studying audiences to thinking about television as the machine central to the technology defining postmodernity.

Although I intend to recover Derrida's treatment of textuality, connecting it with unconscious thought's reach to the *oniric*, nonetheless, my mapping goes through Marxist cultural studies of television, because it opened a path to rethinking teletechnology by forcing a reconsideration of the dependency of Marxist cultural studies on a post-World War II welfare state capitalism, where a certain structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and civil society, and the public and private spheres was presumed and linked to a discourse on democracy as well as made to underwrite a post-Ausslerian political economic analysis. That is to say, the treatment of television awakens Marxist cultural studies and cultural criticism generally to the "flexibilities" of a post-welfare state and a postmodern or late capitalism that is dependent on the globalization of teletechnology and the transnationalization of capital.

Ironically, it is this awakening that forces a view of late postmodern capitalism as inextricable from teletechnology, that is, that neither can be separated from the other so that neither can be the context for the other, the condition of possibility for the other. Reducing teletechnology to the capitalist organization of production becomes politically unexciting. Thinking of one capitalism, thinking of capitalism as totality, or thinking of the history of capitalist organization of production as becoming-universal — all are increasingly unremarkable. Rather, the political and cultural antagonisms of localized capitalisms would be better treated as irreducible to the economic and as pointing instead to what Pheng Cheah has called "a global mixedness" in order to describe the complexities of the condition of agency in a transnational frame of globalized cultures.<sup>20</sup> Although undoubtedly the complexity of agency finally yields states of power including identified subjects, institutions, and groups, it also releases uncharted resources for politics.

Thrown forward, therefore, to rethink capitalism as something other than totality, its history other than becoming-universal, it seems necessary to grasp the historicity that teletechnology gives with its technical

substrate of unconscious memory. It also seems necessary to feel the pressure this historicity exerts on a new ontological perspective to reconfigure the opposition of Being and technicity, so that nature and technology, body and machine, the virtual and the real, and the living and the inorganic might be understood in terms of *differential* relationships rather than oppositional or even dialectical ones. But in order to imagine that the body and the machine, the virtual and the real, and nature and technology are inextricably implicated, always already interfaced, which a *differential* relationship is meant to suggest, it also is necessary to think of materiality and the unconscious differently.

In this sense, what has been thought to be the context constituting the unconscious, that is, the oedipal complex, is to be rethought, especially for the way it functions as the dominant narrative logic informing the construction of the subject's identity and social reality. If early feminist film theory was left without full extension into a Marxist cultural studies of television, it did, however, produce a legacy in what has become known as queer theory; at least Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz have drawn heavily on the revisions of Lacanian psychoanalysis that feminist film theory elaborated. For this, Butler's and Grosz's writings are part of my mapping of the unconscious thought of teletechnology to its reach to the optic. Their writings, when taken together, have brought feminist theory to the ontological implications that have been folded within it from the start, that is, when feminist theory first undertook to rethink sexual difference and the "nature" of the woman's body. Butler and Grosz have provided treatments of bodies, images, and unconscious desire that aim to bring these and feminist theory beyond the oedipal complex, even beyond the human subject. Deconstructing the psychoanalytic configuration of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real even beyond the efforts of feminist film theorists, Butler and Grosz have made it possible to think of bodies as intensities in a flow of electronic images, texts, and sounds, that is, as imagined materialities.

Against Butler's critics, who have accused her work of voluntarism or "ludic feminism,"<sup>11</sup> that is, of failing to deal with the material contingencies of political economy or the institutional arrangements of power, my mapping of her work is meant to take her focus on the imaginary construction of bodies as a gesture toward rethinking bodily matter in the age of teletechnology, to question what institutional or

materiality means in relationship to teletechnological flows of capital, information, labor, and abstract knowledge. What kind of bodily matters are these? I follow Butler's theoretical focus, which, stretched on the limits of psychoanalytic discourse, has forced the treatment of the imaginary to move into a transnational frame where the oedipal narrative is not the only dominant narrative of desire and where it has also become much more important to think about the technical substrate that teletechnology gives unconscious memory. Although Spivak was first to set this agenda for feminist scholars and to show the relevancy of Derridean deconstruction for situating feminism and psychoanalysis in "an international frame,"<sup>17</sup> Butler more specifically has drawn the deconstruction of the oedipal narrative to the construction of bodily matter, and therefore to a shift in ontological perspective.

In her effort to reconfigure the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real in such a way as to deprive the phallus of its transcendental status, Butler not only has let loose the oedipal logic of desire that holds together the structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and civil society, and the private and public spheres, upon which Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalyses depend. Her work also has signaled the need to rethink the real and the nature of bodies, sexualities, and subjectivities in terms of the speeds of teletechnological flows and the vulnerabilities of exposure to media event-ness, which are linked to the globalization of world cultures. For all this, Butler's work fits with the work of a number of postcolonial scholars, who have made it possible to read "the question of woman" into rethinking democratic politics in a transnational frame.

Although Butler's writings must be drawn to the ontological implications of the teletechnological, Grosz's writings have been more explicitly aimed at rethinking ontology. Although, like Butler, Grosz begins by treating the sexed human body in relationship to the limitations of psychoanalysis, she also treats bodies other than human bodies. Grosz, like Butler, means to take the unconscious beyond the oedipal narrative, and, like Butler, she has done so by queering sexual desire. But Grosz finally has turned from psychoanalysis toward Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of desire, the "body without organs" and machinic assemblages.

In Grosz's terms, bodies are "volatile." They are about connections, intensities of vibrations over a surface and its folds, where the differ-

ence between concepts, images, institutions, and discourse are indistinguishable from the perspective of desiring production. Bodies are what desire produces. Grosz's thought of volatile bodies, including but not privileging the human body, is an argument for a *differential* relationship of nature and technology, body and machine, the virtual and the real. Rather than being in an oppositional or dialectical relationship, nature and technology, body and machine, the virtual and the real are intermingled; culture is nature deferred, as is technology. Unlike Butler, Grosz does not treat the body in terms of a radicalized social construction. Rather, for Grosz, bodies are given, in the Derridean sense, in specific modalities of materiality, and it is as such that they are engaged with cultural inscription devices such as racism, sexism, heterosexism, and ethnocentrism, with varying political effects.

In this sense Grosz's treatment of bodies makes explicit the dynamism of matter that in Butler's treatment of bodies remains implicit. For Grosz, all bodies are virtualities of this dynamism; they are images in process, lines of flight to the future. This dynamism, which Cheah has referred to as the subindividual, finite forces of mattering, is for Grosz the desiring of postpersonal thought. Her work on bodies turns into the thought of bodies as desiring production, bodies as machinic assemblages, bodies as the movement of forces. For example, her treatment of architecture suggests a shift from the structural to the mobile, to the speed of flows of singularities into and through bodies, where desire is the movement.

Grosz's work, in my mapping of it, suggests a resolution of what began as the deconstruction of the oedipal narrative and the ungrounding of the structural configuration of family and national ideologies, the state and civil society, and the public and private spheres into a much more complicated but more flexible network for desiring production in the speeds and exposures of the teletechnological. Desire is delivered from the limitations of the historical and geopolitical specificities of the oedipal narrative, and the opposition of the real and the imaginary is displaced. Grosz's writings, along with Butler's, have made it seem that feminist theory was meant all along to deliver desire from its modern elaborations, to give the unconscious over to thought, to make thought and affect inseparable, to make all this palpable through the deconstruction of the psychoanalytic configuration in which the



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