


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
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The Theory of Political Economy

Fourth edition

W. Stanley Jevons

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First edition 1871,

Second edition 1879,

Third edition 1888,

Fourth edition 1911,

Reprinted 2001, 2013

by Macmillan and Co Limited

This edition published 2013

by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN: 978–1–137–37414–1

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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Introduction

Harro Maas

William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) is unquestionably one of the great minds in the history of economics. Today, he is remembered as one of the “fathers” of the so-called marginalist revolution in economics. First published in 1871 and then in 1879 considerably revised and extended with a bibliography of mathematical works in economics, *The Theory of Political Economy* analysed the decisions of economic agents in mathematical form in terms of deliberations over marginal increments of utility. In this “mechanics of utility and self-interest,” economic agents – whether in their role of consumers, workmen or other – maximized a balance of pleasure and pain in the direction of pleasure. Utility, expressed in functional form, became the basis of a new theory of value that substantially departed from the classical political economists’ labour theory of value. Value became identified with exchange value, and this with what we now refer to as marginal utilities, not with costs of production. The book replaced the central problems addressed by classical political economists, dynamic questions of long-term growth and distribution, for that of price formation on markets. In the *Theory* Jevons formulated the central problem of economics differently: as a static optimization problem – how to maximize overall utility given a certain amount of means of production. But he also promised to tackle the problem of market price formation, and in this he did not succeed.

The introduction of utility theory and the calculus might obscure other changes in the form of economic arguments that are perhaps no less important for the transformation of economics Jevons instigated. In the *Theory* Jevons used diagrams and – on a small scale – statistical data to provide evidence for his theoretical claims. Graphs and diagrams play an even more prominent role in his innovative empirical studies in which he also introduced index numbers to make causal inferences on changes in the value of gold following the gold discoveries in California and Australia. Much of his empirical endeavours were devoted to graphical comparisons in the movements of sunspots and the price of wheat to establish a causal nexus between the activity of the sun and commercial fluctuations.

Such tools and instruments, which a modern reader may take for granted, were as alien to political economy as the calculus. Thus, Jevons developed a number of tools that are used in modern economics, but as is often the fate of an innovator, he did not manage to coherently integrate them all. His monumental *Principles of Science*, which he considered his magnum opus, was published shortly after the *Theory* in 1874. But his *Principles of Economics*, on which he worked for much of the 1870s, remained unfinished, perhaps not only because of his untimely death in 1882. In his centennial essay on Jevons, Lord Robbins wrote that Jevons “time and again seems to be on the brink of the modern theory,” without getting there, “all of which is very disappointing” (Robbins, 1936). But he also wrote that Jevons’ genius was perhaps not located in his theoretical work, but in the variety and diversity of his contributions.

The sense that Jevons built a halfway house between political economy of the nineteenth century and modern-day economics helps explain the mixed reception of Jevons’ *Theory* by his contemporaries. Inoue and Mosselmann’s recent collection of reviews and comments by Jevons’ contemporaries shows that most of them were far from negative (Inoue and Mosselmann, 2002). But some of the more important ones were. An anonymous review in the *Saturday Review* for 1

November 1871, possibly from George Wirgman Hemming, a mathematician and fellow of St John's College, Cambridge, was puzzled by the mathematics that seemed to merely state what could be said in words, and did not seem to do much work of its own. John Elliot Cairnes, the last of the classic economists, wrote in the 1875 re-edition of his influential *Lectures on the Character and Logical Method of Political Economy* that the work of his “able friend” did not give him reason to alter the views on method he had expressed as early as 1857. In a famous letter of December 1871, John Stuart Mill, not having read the book, wrote to Cairnes about his general reservations against Jevons’ “man for encumbering questions with useless complications, and with a notation implying the existence of a greater precision in the data than the questions admit of” (Mill 17, 1862–1863).

Even Alfred Marshall took issue with the book. But, as Collison Black rightly noted, Marshall was thinking along similar lines as Jevons, and may have felt robbed of the opportunity to publish first. Marshall was also concerned with the aggressive way in which Jevons distanced himself from his predecessors, especially in the last section of the *Theory*, while he himself tried to strike a balance between the merits of the old school and the new mathematical and utility-based way of theorizing. Finally, the fact that a senior Cambridge wrangler was trumped by a second-rate mathematician from the north may have added to the tone of Marshall’s comments and criticisms.

If one does not judge Jevons’ accomplishments from the vantage point of present theory, as Lionel Robbins did, one can see how extremely good and versatile Jevons was in forging new tools and instruments to unravel the questions he posed to the data. John Maynard Keynes’ portrayal of Jevons scrutinizing his data, spending “hours arranging his charts, plotting them, sifting over them, tinting them neatly with delicate pale colours like the slides of an anatomist, and all the time poring over them and brooding over them to discover their secret,” rightly describes him as pursuing an anatomy or physiology of society. Indeed, as well at home in theory as in the “black arts of inductive economics,” Jevons was, as Keynes perceptively notes, “the first theoretical economist to survey his material with the prying eyes and fertile, controlled imagination of the natural scientist” (Keynes 1936). It was left to the next generation of (political) economists to discover the potential of the tools and instruments that Jevons had bequeathed to economics and to further develop the consequences of his pioneering work.

In what follows, my aim is to show how Jevons translated his knowledge of the research methods used in the natural sciences to political economy in order to radically transform the substance and scientific image of economics. The radicalism of Jevons’ new approach to political economy will be better understood against the background of Victorian discussions of its proper method.

Jevons’ Early Life and Years of Study

Stanley Jevons was born in Liverpool as the ninth child in a middle-class Unitarian family on the first of September 1835.¹ Like the Booths, Huttons, and Martineaus to whom they were related, the Jevons family formed part of the self-confident Unitarian circles who lived in the heartland of the Industrial Revolution and shared a belief in rational argument and the advancement of science to promote the social good. Unitarians were heavily involved in the establishment of literary, philosophical and statistical societies, and pioneers in the emerging sanitary movement.

His father, Thomas Jevons, was an iron merchant with utilitarian sympathies who is said to have invented the first floating iron ship. His mother, Mary-Ann Roscoe, was the daughter of William Roscoe, a Liverpool banker and important collector of Flemish and Italian masters.² His mother died in 1845; his much-beloved eldest brother, Roscoe, went insane; and his father’s iron business went bankrupt in the Great Railway Crisis of 1847. The family moved to Manchester and never recovered from its financial difficulties, which shifted Stanley and his siblings from the commercial elite to the

so-called “uneasy classes” – intellectually gifted, but without the means to leisurely pursue their interests. Thus, Jevons’ youth exemplifies what Thomas Carlyle in *Past and Present* called the “Hell of the English,” a life in which family fortunes became ambushed by financial concerns.

Given his background it is unsurprising that Jevons’ early education was in the natural sciences, which he naturally combined with an interest in the needs and wants of society. Jevons first went to Liverpool Mechanics’ High School, and, after an interlude at a grammar school that was less to his liking, to the preparatory school of University College, London. At the age of only 16 he lived in London, visited the Great Exhibition, and wandered through the “dark alleyways of Spitalfields” to observe the conditions of the working poor. In 1851 he enrolled at University College itself to study mathematics and chemistry.

At University College, Jevons enrolled in courses in experimental philosophy and chemistry, and in the mathematics class of Augustus De Morgan, the first mathematics professor at University College and son-in-law of the radical Unitarian mathematician William Frend. The Cambridge Mathematic Tripos paled in comparison to De Morgan’s mathematics course, which was known, at the time, as the most demanding course of its kind in England. De Morgan was a great propagator of French analysis, an approach to mathematics that by 1850 was still received with considerable scepticism in the Oxbridge system because of its concurrent mechanical worldview.

De Morgan’s mathematics and his mechanical worldview had a lasting impact on Jevons’ intellectual life. In his *Formal Logic* (1847, 26), De Morgan wrote that “with respect to the mind considered as a complicated apparatus, we are not even so well off as those would be who had to examine and decide upon the mechanism of a watch, merely by observation of the function of the hands, without being allowed to see the inside.” In his *Principles of Science* (1874, 222), Jevons similarly wrote that “we are in the position of spectators who witness the productions of a complicated apparatus, but are not allowed to examine its intimate structure.” Jevons’ reliance on mechanical analogies shifted the grounds for studying the “laws of the mind,” what we now would call psychological laws, from an introspective to the outsider’s perspective that we find in the *Theory*; the outside observer could not gauge the inner motives of another mind. But this did not prevent the scientific analysis. The task of economic theory was to uncover the mechanism behind economic phenomena, whether these were to be found in nature or in the functioning of the human mind.

Though Jevons performed well, he never considered himself a mathematician (and was not considered so during his lifetime). Jevons’ forte was in chemistry and the experimental sciences. He won several medals, a gold medal in chemistry amongst others. Through the intervention of his cousin Harry Roscoe, the later professor of chemistry at Owens College, Manchester, Jevons was offered the opportunity to become gold assayer at the newly established mint in Sydney. After some hesitation (and prodding by his father), Jevons accepted the extremely well-paid job (£675 a year), which considerably lifted the financial burdens of the family. Jevons sailed off to Australia in 1854 to stay there for a five-year period. Just two weeks before he would get a job offer for Australia, he pictured himself living the life of a Manchester businessman, amusing himself in the evenings in the basement with instrument-making and “not altogether useless” chemical experiments.

Jevons’ Antipodean Interlude

Jevons’ “Antipodean interlude” significantly influenced his further intellectual career. Not only did the work at the Sydney Mint offer Jevons ample opportunities to pursue his manifold scientific interests, but also the social environment of the Mint itself was highly favourable to scientific pursuits. As a typical Victorian colonial institute the Mint functioned as a nucleus of scientific activity that turned its “imperial gaze” upon Australian nature and society.

The most important Australian science periodical was the *Sydney Magazine of Arts and Sciences*, which Jevons made several contributions, most of them on meteorology. Jevons published experiments on the formation of clouds, in which he attempted to reproduce clouds on a miniature scale in accordance with Howard's classification of clouds. He made these experiments on strong mechanical assumptions and in the hope of rendering his results in mathematical form – something that proved far beyond his reach. Lord Rayleigh, the later Nobel Laureate in physics, reproduced Jevons' experiments in the early 1880s at the Cavendish in Cambridge in order to study diffusion processes in fluids and gases. Jevons also contributed to Waugh's statistical almanac, in which he extensively reported on his statistical observations on the Australian weather. Accompanied by his barometer and thermometer he made excursions to the newly discovered gold mines of New South Wales, and his notebooks are filled with pages of meteorological observations made during these trips.

There was a fluid line between such experimental and statistical investigations, and his investigations into the "moral and physical condition of the working classes." Using approaches similar to those utilised by the statistical societies he knew from his youth, Jevons started working on a social survey of Sydney. He published his findings in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Though only fragments of the original survey remain, his notebooks make clear that he considered his survey the beginning of a "science of towns" that was a prelude to a general "science of man."³

Another example of his early interest in social research is his work on a spectacular stratigraphic chart that would visualise the British "industrial system of society" and link its division of labour to Adam Smith's distinction of human needs.⁴ These investigations date from Jevons' early Sydney period. It is an indication of the continuity in Jevons' interests that the subtitle of his unfinished and posthumously published *Principles of Economics* (1905) was the "industrial mechanism of society."

These examples may serve as early witnesses of how Jevons translated his natural and acquired skills in decomposition and classification of natural phenomena to the social realm, and how he used visualizing techniques from the natural sciences in the social domain. For a long time historians of economics considered Jevons' turn of interest to political economy the result of a volte face, for which a lecture on Jeremy Bentham's felicific calculus served as catalyst. Jevons' appraisal of this lecture is seen as a premonition of the hedonic theory of value that was to become the core of his *Theory*. Also the great interest Jevons showed for the Australian railway debate (on which he made some contributions in the *Empire*, an Australian newspaper) and the ensuing interest in Dionysius Lardner's *Railway Economy*, that was influenced by Antoine-Augustin Cournot's work on oligopolies, is seen in that connection. But from the foregoing it should be clear that natural and social investigations from early on were pursued in parallel, and using the same tools and instruments he was familiar with from his childhood and university training and education. From a very young age Jevons aimed at all-embracing explanations of society that were deeply rooted in a thorough engagement with the experimental method and statistics and fuelled by a predilection for mechanistic explanations.

This short summary of Jevons' scientific pursuits in Australia shows him to be the kind of Victorian who felt more indebted to the Belgian astronomer and revolutionary of statistics, Adolphe Quetelet, than to Mill or August Comte. Quetelet's *De l'homme* was among his books in Sydney. In a short essay for *Nature* (1875), Jevons explicitly paid tribute to Quetelet as the "true founder" of the social sciences because he turned his telescope to society. According to Jevons, by focusing on average values, rather than on particular data, the mechanisms could be uncovered that governed the natural and the social world.

Ideally, mathematics spelled out these mechanisms, but this proved not always possible. When he started collecting materials for his Statistical Atlas project, in the early 1860s, he approvingly quoted Sir John Herschel, who had used the "graphical method" in astronomy when "analytical difficulties

prevented attending a “rigorous solution of equations,” and where the data were “uncertain, irregular and embarrassing” (Maas, 2012). When he wrote to his sister Henrietta that he considered devoting his life to the study of political economy, he described the subject as some sort of “vague mathematics which calculates the causes and effects of man’s industry, and shows how it may best be applied” (L letter of 28 February 1858). Jevons would spell out the meaning of these words only after his return to London to take up his studies in political economy at University College, London.

The Mid-century Split between Theory and Statistics

Jevons enrolled once again at University College, London, at the age of 25, now to study political economy. He quickly became disappointed in its teachings. Early in the 1860s Jevons started writing on his mathematical theory of political economy, for which not only Bentham’s utilitarianism but also physiological reductionist theories of the mind served as important inputs. In his *Principles* Jevons considered that future research would reduce “the tender mechanism of the mind” to “nitrogen and phosphorus.” (735–736) Jevons also started working on his Statistical Atlas project – a highly ambitious project in which he aimed to visualize the history of Great Britain in some 39 diagrams. Jevons’ disappointment with contemporary economics was not just a matter of (emerging) diverging insights on one of the cornerstones of classical political economy, the theory of value; it was also disappointment in its methods of research.

Halfway through the century, Mill’s views in the matter reigned supreme. In Mill’s footsteps John Elliot Cairnes ardently defended the so-called a priori or deductive method of political economy against the inductive, statistical method in his 1857 essays for the Whately Chair of Political Economy at Trinity College, Dublin. Mill had explained both methods, first in his seminal essay of 1836 on the definition and method of political economy that was reprinted in his *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy* (1844, Vol. 4 *Collected Works*) and then in the famous Book VI of *Logic* (1843) that was devoted to the method of the “moral sciences.”

Mill wrote his 1836 essay in a deliberate defence of Ricardian economics, which in the early 1830s had come under serious attack. Mill was adamant there was nothing wrong with Ricardian economics and that its most distinguishing “vice” – its deductivism – was just the way the science should proceed. Mill’s argument for this was quite innovative and had little to do with Ricardian economics per se. Leaning on the philosophy of Adam Smith’s first biographer Dugald Stewart, Mill categorically distinguished between two different fields of science, the sciences of mind and matter. The natural sciences studied the laws of matter. They had either the luxury of simplicity or control and so could reason from data to exact laws, either by sustained observation, as in astronomy, or by the controlled experiment, as in chemistry or mechanics. The sciences of mind (or the “moral sciences”) by contrast were plagued by the complexity of the social realm. For that reason, it was considered impossible to find social laws by means of induction. Mill agreed with the political economists from the Oxford school that such attempts would only lead to incoherent collections of data, numerical or otherwise, from which no law-like regularities could be expected to be deduced.

For political economy Mill constructed an ingenious escape route. Rather than studying mankind in its full complexity, political economy was to be limited to the study of a set of motives on which observations, or mental experiments, could be made within the “private laboratory” of the scientist’s mind. These motives were man’s pursuit of wealth, counteracted by his aversion for labour and his preference for immediate gratification. No economist, Mill added, was so “absurd” to assume the motives exhausted man’s complexity, but this was, inevitably, the “mode” in which the science of economics had to proceed.

Confronted with nature’s boundaries (the population principle, marginal lands), the effects of the

motives played out with necessity – with equal necessity as the laws of mechanics. It was not because of society’s complexity, because of the many confounding factors that exercised their influence as well, that the ensuing laws of political economy could not be observed in their pure form. Therefore, political economy was a science of tendency laws. In Mill’s words, “disturbing causes turned political economy into a science of tendencies. Mill’s defence of (Ricardian) political economy was extremely successful and settled disputes on its proper method for most of the nineteenth century. Mill’s solution was original, and at the time even won over his greatest adversary in matters of method, the Cambridge polymath and philosopher of induction William Whewell.

In his own lectures on the method of political economy, John Elliot Cairnes drew the immediate consequences for the relation between theory and evidence. Political economists did not need the “tedious route of induction” of the natural sciences that was emulated by statistical societies. Political economy was an a priori science and the “business” of the political economist was finished once he had traced an event back to a mental motive. More explicitly than Mill, Cairnes argued that political economy lacked the exactness of the natural sciences, because principles of the mind, by their nature, were not the kind of material fit for measurement. For that reason mathematics and statistics were unfit to bring “numerical exactness” to political economy. Thus, Cairnes’ lectures reflect the “curious separation between abstract theory and empirical work” in which the work of political economists and statisticians became worlds apart (Blaug, 1976).

This was, we have seen, not in agreement with the manner in which Jevons had practiced his social investigations during his years in Australia. The differences in approach can be illustrated with Jevons’ study into the fall of the value of gold. Jevons published this study in 1863, and it was his first public success.⁶ He sent a copy to Cairnes, who replied he had written on the “gold question” from an “a priori” perspective, but was pleasantly surprised that Jevons independently and by “entirely distinct methods of inquiry” had come to similar conclusions (PC 3: 16–17). Cairnes was so enthusiastic that he sent a letter to the *Times* to call attention to Jevons’ pamphlet. Following this success, Jevons started working on the future exhaustion of the British coal mines and its consequences for British prosperity. The publication of *The Coal Question* in 1865 was favourably greeted by Mill, and led to questions in Parliament on the long-term viability of the British budget and to an invitation by William Gladstone to Jevons to Downing Street 10. By the age of 30, Jevons had established a name as an able statistician, but not as an able political theorist.

If we consider Cairnes’ reaction to Jevons’ gold study in more detail, we can understand why. Making use of index numbers, Jevons showed that gold had fallen in value as a result of the Australian and Californian gold influx. But Jevons’ small tract contained a great many other statistical innovations: a logarithmic chart picturing the price of 39 individual commodities against a base period and graphs representing the movements of the average (and individual commodity prices) over time. These were all sufficient innovations to revolutionize a field. Not so then. Cairnes brushed over the differences in method and zoomed in on the details Jevons provided on his private experience while in Australia as gold assayer of the newly established mint. His conclusion was that political economy, as practiced in Britain, was in good shape and in no need of an improvement or change of its tools of inquiry.

The testimony which you bear to the coincidence of my speculations on the local effects of the gold discoveries with your experience in Australia is very valuable: perhaps I might make bold to say so considering that they were the speculations of one who had never visited that country – that it adds something to our grounds for confidence in the essential soundness of economic science as it is cultivated in the u.kingdom [sic]. (PC 3: 22–23)

Mathematics and the “Physical Groundwork” of Economics

But Jevons did not think as highly of the “essential soundness” of political economy. From the early 1860s onwards Jevons attempted to redefine the boundaries created by Mill and Cairnes. Cairnes responded favourably to statistical studies authored by Jevons, but became sceptical when Jevon's work touched on theory.

In his lectures on the method of political economy, Cairnes observed that “every economist, so soon as an economic fact has been traced to a mental principle, considers the question solved.” (Cairnes 1965, 179) He was critical of two authors in particular who transgressed the lines drawn by Mill: Richard Jennings and Henry Dunning Macleod. Both men claimed that the ultimate foundations of the laws of political economy were to be found in man's physiological constitution. But if authors like Jennings and Macleod considered political economy to consist in the study of man's “afferent trunk and nerve-fibre” it was “evident” that political economy would soon “become a whole different study from that which the world has hitherto known it” (Cairnes, 1965, 231).

In the early 1860s, and in notable contrast to Cairnes, Jevons enthusiastically embraced Jennings' suggestion to ground the laws of political economy in man's physiology. In the *Theory* he would write that Jennings “most clearly appreciated the nature and the importance of the laws of utility” by treating the “physical groundwork of Economy, showing its dependence on physiological laws” (1871: 65). While Cairnes dismissed Jennings's suggestion to “exhibit” the “result of the principles of human nature ... by the different methods of Algebra and Fluxions,” Jevons considered this “a clear statement of the views which I have also adopted” (1871: 18).

In February 1860, he wrote in his diary that he had arrived at a “true comprehension of *Value* regarding which I have lately very much blundered” (PC 7:120). Immediately preceding this remark we find Jevons “reading up the *Nervous System*,” a plausible reference to Marshall Hall's *Memoirs of the Nervous System* of 1837 (White, 1994a). In June, Stanley Jevons famously wrote to his brother Herbert that he had found the decisive elements of his new theory of utility, especially “the most important axiom” of the declining degree of what he then called the “ratio of utility,” on the assumption that, “on an average,” this ratio of utility was “some continuous mathematical function of the quantity of commodity” (Jevons (LJ: 151).

In the *Theory*, Jevons approvingly referred to Jennings' suggestion that “sensations vary in degree with changes in quantities.” According to Jevons, political economists had assumed this law “under the more complex form and name of the Law of Supply and Demand” (LJ: 151). Thus, Jevon's engagements with psychophysiology and his attempt to mathematise the theory of value were intimately connected. Jevons used Bentham's felicific calculus to formulate his theory of pleasure and pain, but psychophysiology helped Jevons to think of these feelings in functional form. Degrees of pleasure, diminishing inversely with quantities consumed, explained market prices.

Jevons gave two examples how numerical precision could be given to his theory. The first was a small table of prices and quantities of wheat that went back to the political arithmeticians Gregory King and Charles Davenant, the second (self-)experiments on work and fatigue that he first published in *Nature*. Both examples show the same attitude to research Jevons had shown during his Australian years. Throughout the nineteenth century, the King-Davenant table had served as a reference point in discussions about the possibility of mathematising political economy, for example, for Thomas Tooke and William Whewell but also for Cairnes (Creedy, 1992). Jevons showed how this table could give numerical exactness to the notion of the final degree of utility, the “all important element of political economy,” and so how statistical data could give precision to theory (Stigler, 1994; White, 1989). These examples thus explicitly challenged those “uninquiring and unhoping spirits” – Mill and Cairnes – who despaired about the possibilities of measurement and mathematisation in economic

As his examples aimed to show, the fact pleasures and pains were weighted “in the bosom of the mind” did not prevent economics from becoming a mathematical and exact science.

Indeterminacy in Exchange

Jevons’ first airing of his new mathematical theory of value was the short *Notice* of 1862 that was read in his absence to the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) and published in 1866 as the *Brief Account*. Jevons felt prompted to write down an extended version of his theory after William Thornton’s challenge to the classical wages fund theory in 1867 and the ensuing debate. The debate would also colour the reception of Jevons’ *Theory*.

The context of Thornton’s intervention was the controversy about the role of trade unions in the economy. Most political economists were of the opinion that the collusion of workmen in unions would only disturb the working of the labour market, and would not lead to a permanent rise of the wage rate because of the Malthusian “iron law of wages.” At the time, this principle was expressed in Mill’s version of the wages fund theory, which said that the wage rate followed from the available fund for the payment of wages divided by population.

Thornton argued that classical political economy was wrong in assuming that wages would necessarily be pushed to subsistence level. While political economists assumed that the law of supply and demand would automatically lead to one price, some well-chosen examples helped to show that prices could be indeterminate. The upshot of his argument was that there was no unalterable wages fund that resulted in wages being pushed back to their minimum level, but that this fund, the capital from which wages were paid, was itself subject to change. This offered trade unions the opportunity to bargain for higher wages, a conclusion that was in marked contrast with the received opinions of political economists.

At the time, rightly or wrongly, the wages fund theory was considered central to classical political economy, and when Thornton’s challenge led to Mill’s famous recantation of the theory, this provoked vehement debates as to the character of the “law of supply and demand.” Jevons’ extensive exchange of letters with the engineer H. C. Fleeming Jenkin on the subject was the immediate reason to speed up publishing an extended version of his mathematical theory of utility of which his *Brief Account* of 1866 had only given a glimpse. When Fleeming Jenkin published his “Graphic Representation of the Laws of Supply and Demand” in 1870, Jevons clearly feared that he would lose the opportunity to publish his mathematical theory first, and as a result, in just half a year he completed the *Theory*.

In his *Essay* of 1836 Mill had relegated the “laws of the consumption of wealth” outside the domain of political economy. Jevons, by contrast, made these “laws of human enjoyment” the cornerstone of his new theory. To articulate these laws, Jevons used Bentham’s felicific calculus, but he grounded this calculus in man’s physiological dispositions. Rather than thinking of pleasures and pains as motives on which the mind decides, Jevons transformed them into physical forces that drive to a mechanical balance to equilibrium. The cover image of this edition sums up the main characteristics of Jevons’ theory. Two utility curves for two commodities x and y of one person (“trading body”) are superposed and inverted upon one another. The final degree of utility is pictured vertically (though no axis is drawn), with commodities on the horizontal. The diagram shows how one person would make a net gain in utility by extending trade from a' in the direction of m , and would lose in utility when trading beyond that point. Hence, there emerges an equilibrium for this individual at m .

This balancing model was taken to represent the individual’s balancing of pleasures and pains at the margin. As Jevons put it in the *Theory*: “the will is our pendulum and its oscillations are minutely registered in the price lists of the markets.” This theory enabled Jevons to state relative prices in terms

of marginal utilities. But Jevons could only do so on the assumption of the “law of one price,” exacting the condition Thornton had problematised in his criticism of Mill’s wages fund theory. As a result he was unable to contribute to the contemporary debate on price formation; this had been pointed out to him in correspondence with Fleeming Jenkins. Jevons’ theory did not explain price formation; rather it only showed how individuals adjusted demand and supply at a given price.

It was therefore quite understandable that his contemporary economists did not quite know what to make of the book. If it only rearticulated prices in terms of utilities, but did not actually solve the problem opened up by Thornton’s intervention, then what exactly was its contribution? It did not help that Jevons limited the scope of his book to statics, while “the real condition of industry is one of perpetual motion and change.” In the “purely static case” economic agents – “trading bodies” – exchanged fixed amounts of commodities at a given price until they reach equilibrium. How they do so remained unexplained, and it fell to next generations of economists to tackle that question. But Jevons had changed the tools to do so.

Jevons’ Investigative Spirit

Jevons drowned near Hastings on 13 August in 1882 at the age of only 47, leaving his wife, Harriet Taylor, and three young children. At the time he was working, amongst others, on his *Principles of Economics*, a book that even in its unfinished form shows the continuities with his scientific endeavours in Australia. In retrospect, it is undeniable that the theory of utility brought Jevons the fame he had hoped for. The publications dating after the *Theory* (1871) and *Principles of Science* (1874) are generally considered of less importance. During the 1870s Jevons turned his attention to the study of the business cycle, in which he attempted to establish a causal connection between solar activity and commercial crises. Though not as far-fetched as sometimes thought (the famous astronomer William Herschel, John Herschel’s father, had in fact voiced similar ideas in the early nineteenth century), the causal mechanism and the statistical evidence were problematic and increasingly cast doubt on the whole enterprise. Jevons also wrote a number of highly successful primers; the primer on logic went through numerous reprints (up to 1931), and his *Money and the Mechanism of Exchange* (1875) sold very well too. Jevons also worked on the second edition of the *Theory*, which appeared in 1879 and which contained an extensive survey of precursors to mathematical economics.

In *The State in Relation to Labour* (1882) and a posthumous collection of essays on social reform (1883), Jevons engaged with the social and political issues of his day, issues that had been close to his mind from his formative years in Australia. At the end of the 1870s he wrote a number of vehement attacks on Mill’s philosophy that, given the towering status of Mill as a political economist and philosopher, actually harmed Jevons’ own intellectual status. Having moved from Owens College to University College, London, in 1876 to take up the professorship in political economy, he resigned in 1880, partly because of problems of health, but more importantly to be able to devote all his time to writing. His untimely death in 1882 left his last large project, the *Principles of Economics*, unfinished. It was published, with some additional essays, in 1905.

Jevons’ statistical work in the 1850s and 1860s, his imaginative, but among economists unfortunately less well-known, work in formal logic, published as *Pure Logic, and Other Minor Works* (1890), his *Coal Question* (1865) that I only touched upon briefly, and his *Theory of Political Economy* and *Principles of Science* stand out as landmark contributions to economics and to the philosophy of science. A genuine Victorian polymath, Jevons worked in many different fields of the sciences, that he all engaged in the same investigative spirit.

Jevons’ belief in the power of mathematics to capture the mechanism of the subject under study

irrevocably altered the image of economics, and is perhaps still with us. In many of the sciences, satisfactory explanation nowadays requires the description of a mechanism, and economics is no exception to this. Robert Lucas once described economic theory as providing an “explicit set of instructions for building ... a mechanical imitation system” (1980, 697). In retrospect we may hear the echo of Jevons’ approach to economics in these words.

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